Marco J. Shmerykowsky

SCI-TECH BRIEFING
An occasional series on science and technology

by Marco J. Shmerykowsky


This week The Ukrainian Weekly introduces a new feature, "Sci-Tech Briefing," an initiative of the Ukrainian Engineers' Society of America. The debut article by Marco Shmerykowsky was prepared for The Weekly in late October.


The collapse of the Twin Towers

It has been two months since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, and like most New Yorkers I still can't fully comprehend what happened. "How could two massive high-rise buildings simply vanish in an instant?" was the question a close friend, who happened to be across the street from the Twin Towers at the time of the attack, asked me that day. Although fire caused by burning aviation fuel was a major factor in the collapse, there were also other factors, which draw from the basic elements and theories of high-rise building design.

Buildings and structural loads

The structural elements of any building provide a way for loads from higher-floor levels to travel into the supporting ground. The loads supported by the building can be separated into two general categories: gravity loads and lateral loads. Gravity loads are due to forces caused by the weights of all the materials supported by the building, such as steel, concrete, plumbing pipes, electrical wire, office partitions, furniture and people. Lateral loads are due to the horizontal forces from events such as wind pushing against the walls of a building.

While lateral loads may play a comparatively minor role in the design of a sheltered, low-rise building, they have a significant impact on the design of a high-rise building. This is because a tall building provides a large surface for collecting the wind, which translates into a large horizontal force. The structural engineer also needs to ensure that the building will be stiff enough so that under normal wind conditions it does not sway like a ship caught in a hurricane, but remains comfortable for the people who occupy it.

All high-rise buildings have special portions known as lateral load resisting systems that are specifically designed to address problems due to lateral loads. These systems consist of frames composed of beams, columns and diagonal members that are specially connected to transmit lateral forces. The frames can be located anywhere within the building.

Design of the Twin Towers

The Twin Towers used a lateral load resisting system known as a tube system, in which a series of closely spaced perimeter columns and deep perimeter beams are used to create a shell that has the strength and stiffness of a large square steel "flagpole." In this system, the perimeter columns are designed to carry both lateral loads and gravity loads, and the interior columns are designed to carry only gravity loads. The net result is that the designers obtain a larger area of usable floor space.

The gravity forces on each floor level of the Twin Towers were collected by a floor system that consisted of open-web joists, which spanned 60 feet between the perimeter and core columns. An open web joist is basically a long truss that has top and bottom members (known as a chord), which are connected by diagonal members in a zig-zag pattern. These members are attractive from a design perspective because they can span long distances but weigh less than comparable solid steel beams.

In addition to supporting the floor, the open web joists interacted with the perimeter columns by providing brace points at each floor level. The lateral bracing of a column is an important concept because it has a direct relation to the amount of load a column can carry. As a column becomes longer, the amount of load it can carry decreases. If the length is too long in relation to the magnitude of the load, the column will want to bend sideways or buckle. Since beams connect to the column at each floor level and in each direction, the effective design length is considered to be the distance between floors.

Causes of the collapse

With these basic concepts of structural engineering in mind, it is possible to understand both why the towers withstood the initial impact of the airplanes and why the towers eventually collapsed.

When one of the airplanes collided with the towers, the initial impact destroyed a number of the perimeter columns, floor joists and core columns. Once these structural elements were destroyed, the building essentially re-wired itself and redistributed the loads to the remaining structural elements.

Since the perimeter columns were designed to simultaneously carry both the gravity loads of a fully occupied building and the lateral loads in extreme wind conditions, and to provide the building with enough stiffness for the tower to be comfortable for its occupants, the net result was that the members had extra load carrying capacity under normal conditions. Thus, after the collision of the airplane with the tower, there was sufficient structure remaining to continue supporting the tower.

The fire due to the aviation fuel, however, served to amplify the damage that was done. Typical high-rise construction requires that the builders provide two to three hours worth of fire protection around main structural members. The aviation fuel fire, however, burned much hotter and quicker than a normal office fire. As a result, the fireproofing material most likely disappeared quickly.

Once the steel was unprotected and heated beyond 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit, the steel began to weaken and soften. Since the floor joists are built of thin components, they were most likely damaged by the fire first. As the floor framing failed, the bracing that the joists were providing to the columns was eliminated. Suddenly the remaining already highly loaded columns had their capacity reduced because they effectively became taller. As the fire continued to burn, the combined effect of failing floor members and weakening columns created a condition where the gravity loads from the portion of the tower above the fire could no longer be supported.

Once this point was reached, the top portion of the tower acted like a hammer driving a nail into a piece of wood. The levels at the collision point collapsed, allowing the upper floors to fall and hit the first undamaged floor. This impact was too great for that level to withstand, so it too failed. This sequence of floors stacking up like pancakes kept repeating floor after floor, until the entire structure was destroyed.

The second tower to be attacked was the first one to collapse for the simple reason that the plane hit at a lower point. Thus, there was more gravity load pushing on the tower's damaged section.

The collapse of the towers was a horrific experience for every New Yorker who experienced it first-hand and for millions more who experienced it on television. What should be noted and praised, however, is that the towers were designed so that they stood for nearly an hour after the tragic attacks occurred. This application of engineering principles allowed thousands of people to escape the towers with their lives.


Marco J. Shmerykowsky, P.E., is a principal at Shmerykowsky Consulting Engineers in New York, teaches high-rise design at The Cooper Union School of Engineering, and is president of the New York Chapter of the Ukrainian Engineers' Society of America.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, November 18, 2001, No. 46, Vol. LXIX

Massive force of blasts triggered towers' collapse

Massive force of blasts triggered towers' collapse

Paul Kelso and Tim Radford
Wednesday September 12, 2001
The Guardian


Until yesterday's devastating impacts reduced them to rubble, the twin towers of the World Trade Centre dominated the New York skyline, iconic symbols of American achievement.

Situated at the southern end of Manhattan island, the 110-storey, 1,350ft silver slabs towered over Wall Street and provided office space to around 40,000 employees. Ninety thousand more visited on a daily basis. The towers were the largest commercial complex in the world, complete with their own subway station.

Commissioned in the 1960s by the Port Authority of New York from architect Minoru Yamasaki - who was famously afraid of heights - they were built a deliberate 100ft taller than the Empire State Building, and when they opened in 1973 added 10m square feet of office space to the city's cramped financial district.

The ground excavated for the foundations was shoved into the Hudson river and used to create Battery Park, a green space facing Staten Island that was yesterday swamped beneath the shattered towers.

The towers were initially derided as white elephants, but the economic boom of the 1980s ensured near total occupancy, and with their distinctive appearance they became an instantly recognisable landmark as well as an economic success.

Graham Masterton, a structural engineer, said towers on this scale are almost impossible to protect from the impact of two passenger planes ploughing into them. The only building capable of remaining standing after such an impact would have to be designed "like a nuclear bunker".

"Initially you have localised damage at the point of impact, although the scale of this would have been beyond what an architect usually takes into account," said Mr Masterton, a senior spokesman for the Institute of Civil Engineers.

"This massive force would have reverberated through the building, above and below ground, and this would have a significant weakening effect.

"The twin towers didn't collapse immediately, but the structural strength was affected by the subsequent explosion and the progressive effects of the fire seem to have triggered the final collapse.

"Of course it is up to investigators to identify the exact cause of the collapse but it seems to have been a combination of catastrophic events beyond any reasonable expectations."

Duncan Steel, a physicist at the University of Salford, said the impact of a laden passenger airliner, even at several hundred miles an hour, is less than the force imposed on a tall building by normal high winds. However, he calculated that the subsequent explosion of fuel would have dwarfed the initial impact.

"I would imagine that the major damage that caused the building to collapse is the release of that fuel," he said. "It was a delayed explosion in each case."

"It's a very large explosion," said Scott Steedman, a civil engineer and an expert in natural disasters. "You have the energy in the plane itself, its weight and speed, which is absorbed by the building on a monumental scale.

"Typically that deflection would be likely to be less than the wind deflection. The impact of an aeroplane on the side of the building will also cause it to deflect, and then it will bounce back again, and the energy will be absorbed into the structure.

"But of course if it is full of aviation fuel then that impact is absolutely monumental. In this case, it is obviously clear that the impact was so enormous it has knocked the building sideways."

Tall buildings are designed to absorb horizontal shock. The World Trade Centre towers, built on rubber bases, normally swayed by a metre or more in the wind.

The architect and the engineers developed a rigid "hollow tube" design of closely spaced steel columns with floor trusses extending across to a central core.

The foundations of the centre extend some 70ft underground in huge concrete piles that connect with the unusually hard bedrock of Manhattan island. This rock is ideally suited to take the load of tall buildings. Without it the island would not be able to support even its more modest buildings, and the World Trade Centre towers could never have been contemplated.

The towers became a potent symbol of America's global dominance, as well as a tourist attraction.

In 1993 Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, motivated by hatred of Israel and America, planted a bomb in the underground car park of Tower 1, the second to collapse yesterday. The subsequent explosion killed six people but failed to fulfil Ismoil's ambition of toppling one tower into the other and killing 250,000 people. Yesterday's attacks succeeded where he failed.

Twin towers' collapses due to fire, expert says

Twin towers' collapses due to fire, expert says

Engineers talks of Trade Center myths, argues fire-proofing doomed building

Tania Ganguli

An expert on the Sept. 11 collapse of the World Trade Center explained Monday how researchers discovered that the fires from the explosion caused the twin towers to collapse.

W. Gene Corley, who headed the committee of postmortem studies for the American Society of Civil Engineers, detailed for Northwestern engineering professors and students both past misinterpretations and truths about why the towers collapsed.

Corley maintained that the buildings did not collapse because the fires were hotter or lasted longer than the building could stand. He illustrated his point by showing a photograph, taken of the hole in one of the towers shortly after the crash, in which a person standing inside the building did not appear affected by the heat.

"There is a person standing there who is not bothered by the heat and from that we determined that this is a normal office fire," Corley said.

He also presented the audience with a photograph of a large fireball enveloping a portion of each of the towers, arguing the initial fire burned out within three to nine minutes and exhausted all the fuel from the plane.

According to Corley, the initial impact weakened the buildings so much that any extra disturbance, including the fires that followed, would have caused a collapse.

"A strong wind would've done the same thing," Corley said. "It is our position that if there had been no fire, the buildings would have stood indefinitely until some other major occurrence."

Although the fires did not burn long, they burned thoroughly, he said. One of the major reasons the fires burned the buildings as completely as they did was the fact that the sprinklers failed to work, he said.

When the planes hit the towers, they cut through the water supply that would otherwise have helped calm the fires, Corley said.

Corley went on to discuss the fire-proofing of the internal columns done during the construction of the buildings in the 1960s, which also contributed to the building's collapse. Much of the World Trade Center's fire-proofing was not secured strongly enough to withstand the impact of the planes hitting the buildings.

Civil engineering Prof. Ray Krizek pointed out the preparation that was done on the part of the World Trade Center's structural engineers.

"They did design for an (airplane) hitting it," Krizek said.

Structurally, the buildings should have been able to withstand the impact, Corley said. The fire-proofing, an aspect that the architect designs, was the ultimate problem.

"You've never heard anyone say the architect screwed up," Corley said. "They say, 'What did the structural engineers do wrong?'"

Ahmad Hadavi, a civil engineering professor and associate director of the masters of project management program, attributed this misunderstanding to the public's image of an architect as just a designer.

"People think of an architect as the artist who thinks of what to do with the space, not (as a person) who thinks of structural considerations," Hadavi said.


A Berkeley Engineer Searches for the Truth About the Twin Towers' Collapse

A Berkeley Engineer Searches for the Truth About the Twin Towers' Collapse

Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl's computer simulations suggest more-conventional skyscrapers might have withstood the attacks

By JEFFREY R. YOUNG

When the World Trade Center's burning south tower crumbled to the ground five years ago, just 56 minutes after terrorists crashed a Boeing 767 passenger jet into its upper floors, Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl's horror was mixed with professional surprise.

As a professor of structural engineering at the University of California at Berkeley and an expert on steel structures, he thought that the buildings should have stood longer, even after such a catastrophic impact, and that the collapse should not have been so nearly vertical.

"From the day that I stood there and watched it collapse" on television, he says, "I was thinking that this is impossible. That there's something strange here."

Mr. Astaneh-Asl says he knew immediately that he wanted to be a part of the scientific response to the tragedy. He felt that his unique expertise could help in understanding how the two towers collapsed. He was well versed in the effects of terrorist bombings on buildings, having conducted research on blast effects after a car bomber brought down the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. And he had long studied how buildings responded to earthquakes and other natural disasters, so he knew that researchers must act fast to get the clues needed to understand what had happened.

The day after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Mr. Astaneh-Asl submitted an emergency grant proposal to the National Science Foundation asking for money to examine the steel at ground zero firsthand. Only days later, the request granted, Mr. Astaneh-Asl flew to New York and spent weeks at a recycling center where the towers' remains were being scrapped. There he inspected and collected samples of joints and other scraps of steel from what were once two of the tallest buildings in the world.

Though his NSF grant soon ended, questions about the collapse remained. Mr. Astaneh-Asl decided to create a computer simulation of the plane attacks, with as much detail as possible, in the hope that the unprecedented tragedy might yield lessons that could be used in the design of future skyscrapers.

He did not expect the discoveries he would make, the political obstacles he would face — or that, five years later, he would be involved in a struggle for skyscraper safety.

This week Mr. Astaneh-Asl is scheduled to present findings from his latest simulations in a lecture at Berkeley, making an argument that is sure to raise eyebrows in the engineering community and beyond.

If the World Trade Center towers had been built in a more conventional way and in strict accordance with New York City building codes — from which they were exempt because they were built under the auspices of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey — the buildings probably would not have collapsed, he argues, and thousands of lives might have been saved.

Two extensive government investigations found no fault with the towers' structural design, and many engineers say that no engineer could have anticipated or shielded against kamikaze attacks by fuel-laden jetliners. And some say that what-if scenarios are fruitless lines of research.

Leslie E. Robertson, who helped design the twin towers, could not be reached for comment. But William Faschan, a partner at Leslie E. Robertson Associates, defended the building's performance. "It's extraordinary that any building could withstand that event and remain standing," he says. Mr. Faschan says he is not familiar with Mr. Astaneh-Asl's research and would not comment on its findings.

Even Mr. Astaneh-Asl is careful when discussing his findings, stressing that the people who perished in the buildings' collapse "were murdered by terrorists." But he insists that it is his obligation as an engineer to seek "the truth" about the buildings' history and structure. He speaks excitedly about the importance of his findings, and talks eagerly for hours about the topic.

"We can avoid this happening to someone's loved ones in the future," he says.

'Virtual Replica'

His work examining steel near ground zero gave Mr. Astaneh-Asl a few short minutes of fame. He was interviewed on The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer, CNN, and National Public Radio, as well as by several newspapers, including The Chronicle. At the time, he stressed the positive aspects of the twin towers' performance on the day of the attacks, noting that the length of time the buildings stood allowed most occupants to escape.

Mr. Astaneh-Asl says that from his inspection of the steel, he decided the collapse was not due to faulty welding or poor workmanship. That meant he was still not sure exactly how the collapse happened.

Then he got a call from an analyst from MSC Software Corporation, which makes high-end computer-modeling software used by carmakers and other businesses. Company officials had seen the Berkeley professor quoted in the news media, and offered to donate the company's software for his efforts. He quickly took them up on their offer and began the next phase of his research.

Mr. Astaneh-Asl wanted the computer simulation to be as true to life as possible. That would require the blueprints and construction specifications for the twin towers.

"Basically you build the towers inside your computer with all the dimensions — you represent each element of your structure," he says. "It's really a virtual replica of your physical structure."

But the building plans for the towers turned out to be hard to come by, as the developers kept them sealed from public view. Experts say that most developers keep such documents private, viewing them as proprietary information, but Mr. Astaneh-Asl says he had hoped that, considering the circumstances, the plans would be made available to researchers.

He nearly got access by joining an investigation team led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Society of Civil Engineers, which brought together some two dozen researchers and engineers in late 2001.

Mr. Astaneh-Asl was initially asked to participate, but he says he was troubled that team members were all required to sign a nondisclosure form promising to keep certain details of the investigation, including the buildings' architectural plans, to themselves. Mr. Astaneh-Asl's says he felt the agreement violated his academic freedom, and so he resigned from the team before its investigation got under way.

(The leader of that investigation, W. Gene Corley, says he believes the wording of the nondisclosure agreement would not have stopped any participant in the investigation from publishing academic papers about the structures. "It essentially said that we would not use information we obtained there to be used in a lawsuit against the owners and designers of the building," says Mr. Corley, who is senior vice president of the CTL Group, in Skokie, Ill.)

After the Berkeley professor had nearly lost hope of obtaining the blueprints, he was invited to testify before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Science, in March of 2002, at a hearing titled "Learning From 9/11: Understanding the Collapse of the World Trade Center."

There, he was asked what "impediments" he had encountered in his research, and he replied that the largest one was his inability to get the design and engineering documents. Soon afterward, he was sent a copy of the plans by an official from FEMA. (He jokes that his wife wishes he had also asked for money to support his research.)

As Mr. Astaneh-Asl examined the construction documents, however, he was horrified by aspects of the design. He says the structure essentially threw out the rule book on skyscraper construction. "This building was so strange, and so many violations of practice and code were introduced," he says.

The design contains at least 10 unusual elements, he says. For example, rather than using a traditional skeletal framework of vertical and horizontal columns, the twin towers relied partly on a "bearing wall" system in which the floors and walls worked together to support each other, says Mr. Astaneh-Asl. That system allowed designers to use thinner steel in the buildings' columns and exterior than would be used in a traditional design, he says, adding that in some places the steel in columns was only one-quarter of an inch thick. And he says the designers used stronger steel (measured in what is known as "yield strength") in some columns than is allowed by any U.S. building codes, and that such steel is less flexible — and therefore more brittle — than the type traditionally used in such buildings.

As a result of such design elements, he argues, when the two airliners smashed into the upper floors of the towers, both planes plunged all the way in, wings and all. Airliners carry much of their fuel in their wings. His model clearly shows that in the initial fight between the plane and the building's exterior, the plane won, easily breaching the structure.

"It's like a soda can hit with a pencil," says Mr. Astaneh-Asl. "It was so easy that the plane went in without any damage and took the thousands of gallons of jet fuel in."

The structural innovations meant the developers saved money because they could use less steel, says Mr. Astaneh-Asl.

Efforts were made at the time of construction to verify the buildings could withstand anticipated forces, including high winds. The towers were among the first buildings ever to be modeled and tested in a wind tunnel before they were built. The buildings were widely praised for the efficiency of their construction.

But Mr. Astaneh-Asl argues that in engineering, innovations should — and usually do — emerge slowly, through evolutionary processes that follow time-tested practices. "Structural engineering is something that evolved," he says. "It was not invented."

"Unfortunately and tragically, when [this design] was subjected to this terrorist attack, there's no way this building could stand it."

Ross B. Corotis, a professor of civil engineering at the University of Colorado at Boulder, disagrees, arguing that the innovations did not mean that the towers were poorly designed. "I think our understanding of materials and our ability to analyze structural behavior gives us the ability to innovate more without introducing additional risk," he says.

Would a traditional structure have done better?

To try to answer that question, Mr. Astaneh-Asl and his team made another computer model in which they altered the design of the north tower's structure to make it more consistent with what the researcher calls standard engineering-design practice. Then he ran the same simulated plane into the structure in the same place it hit on September 11, 2001.

In that scenario, the airplane's wings are torn off, and therefore kept out of the building, when they hit the outer wall, while the fuselage still pierces the wall. "When it gets inside, there's not very much fuel," he says. Government reports found that it was not the damage from the planes, but the subsequent fires that weakened the steel and caused the buildings' collapse.

Mr. Astaneh-Asl says he cannot be certain whether a more-traditional building would have survived the smaller fire that would have followed because he is not an expert on fires. Even so, he argues, if the World Trade Center towers had been designed "using the codes and traditional systems, the building most likely would have survived — it most likely would not have collapsed."

The Prevailing View

Many engineers disagree with Mr. Astaneh-Asl's conclusions.

Mr. Corotis argues that "that particular design probably did better than most traditional designs would have done." One feature that helped, he says, was a cap across the tops of the towers that helped the buildings redistribute weight after the planes knocked gaps in them. Though he has not seen the blueprints for the structures, he says he is familiar with the building's innovative design, which has been widely publicized.

"Given the size of the planes and given the fire," he says, "the fact that they did come down is not surprising — but it's still shocking."

The most extensive investigation of the towers' collapse, completed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, also found no fault with the structure, but it did acknowledge the buildings' unique history and design.

"The buildings were unlike any others previously built, both in their height and in their innovative structural features," a report on the investigation says. "Nevertheless, the actual design and approval process produced two buildings that generally were consistent with nearly all of the provisions of the New York City Building Code and other building codes of that time that were reviewed by NIST. ... The departures from the building codes and standards identified by NIST did not have a significant effect on the outcome of September 11."

And the other government investigation into the collapse, led by FEMA, reached the same conclusion.

"We didn't really cite anything we thought the designers should have known about at that time," says Mr. Corley, who led that investigation. "It would have made no difference to what happened regardless of what building code it was built under."

Mr. Corley says Mr. Astaneh-Asl's simulations do not prove that the design was flawed. "If I know what's going to happen, I can design something that can do better" under those circumstances, he says.

Mr. Astaneh-Asl responds that his modified version of the towers was not designed specifically for an airplane strike. "We designed this building assuming that they were building this building in 1970 following the [New York City] code without any consideration of an airplane," he says.

He sounds exasperated by what has come to be the accepted wisdom among engineers: that there was nothing wrong with the buildings. "I cannot see why the entire profession has agreed to sit in this convenient seat of saying that there is nothing wrong with our work," he says.

Skyscraper Safety

For the most part, Mr. Astaneh-Asl has done little to publicize his findings so far, especially since he still hopes to publish a scientific paper about his latest simulation. He agreed to talk to The Chronicle only after a reporter called him to follow up on its previous coverage of his research.

He did present the findings in July at MSC Software's Virtual Product Development Conference, in Huntington Beach, Calif. An article that ran in Design News says the presentation had audience members "spellbound."

But Mr. Astaneh-Asl has been drawn into the political fight over the new Freedom Tower that is slated to be built at ground zero. Last year he joined an advisory panel of a group started by families of 9/11 victims. The group, the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, is lobbying to, among other things, require the new office tower to adhere to local building codes, rather than to the Port Authority's guidelines.

"They're going to design this building without going to City Hall and getting permits," says Mr. Astaneh-Asl, his voice rising. "Even if you want to change your kitchen, you have to get a permit."

The Berkeley researcher says he initially declined the group's invitation to join because he wanted to remain completely independent. Aside from the free software, Mr. Astaneh-Asl says that his simulations research is not financially supported by anyone, and that he and the graduate students who helped with the project have volunteered their time, even using their personal computers. He says he later agreed to join the Skyscraper Safety Campaign's advisory panel because he supports their argument about building codes, but that the group has not given him any money.

Sally Regenhard is the leader of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign. Her son was a firefighter who perished responding to the attacks. Ms. Regenhard says that the government was slow to investigate the performance of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and of the emergency response that followed. "There was a huge, huge force of don't ask, don't tell — don't ask questions," she says.

Many people outside engineering and government have developed their own theories about how and why the World Trade Center buildings fell. Some, wondering how buildings that easily withstood fierce wind gusts for decades were so quickly brought down by airplanes, argue that explosives planted before the attacks must also have been involved. Even some college professors have advanced such theories, though they have largely been dismissed (The Chronicle, June 23).

Mr. Astaneh-Asl also rejects such alternative theories. "I certainly don't buy into any of the conspiracy stuff," he says.

"Those are lightweight buildings," he adds. "There was no need for explosives to bring them down."

Professor S. Kitipornchai

Are tall buildings in Hong Kong safe from terrorist plane crashes?

by Professor S. Kitipornchai

No-one will ever forget September 11, 2001 – a day when the most powerful country in the world was caught completely off guard. Groups of well co-ordinated terrorists managed with relative ease to hijack a number of commercial planes and slam them into the 110-storey twin towers of the World Trade Centre and a section of the Pentagon.

The two Boeing 767 planes that crashed into the twin towers had just taken off, and both carried full tanks of fuel (91,000 litres). The twin towers were completely destroyed with the loss of over 6000 lives. The north tower, which was hit first, at about the 90th floor, stood for 1 hour and 45 minutes, whilst the south tower, which was hit at about the 60th floor, collapsed after only 45 minutes. Both towers collapsed spectacularly in front of millions of television viewers around the world. This raises some fundamental questions: why and how did the towers collapse, and are tall buildings in Hong Kong safe from similar attacks?

Engineers have anticipated planes crashing into tall buildings

The twin towers were the tallest buildings (416 m tall) in the world when they were completed in the 1970s. The buildings, 63.4m x 63.4m in plan, were framed in structural steel with closely spaced exterior steel columns, each of which were 476 mm wide and 560 mm apart, forming an exterior hollow tube wall. This wall acted as a structural frame, and provided the necessary lateral resistance. The central steel core of the building was designed to carry vertical or gravity loads. Horizontal steel trusses that spanned 18.3 m from exterior tube wall to the core supported the concrete floor, which also acted as a rigid diaphragm at each level.

Engineers have long anticipated the scenario of planes crashing into tall buildings. In 1945, a USAF bomber crashed into the 79th floor of the 102-storey Empire State Building in Manhattan. The crash occurred during a misty night, and the damage was restricted to the impact area. There have also been a number of near misses.

One of the criteria used in the design of the World Trade Centre was that if a Boeing 707 should hit either of the towers, then it would go right through without damaging the other storeys. This would be like punching a hole through the wall of a hollow tube without making the tube collapse. Calculations can easily show that such an impact will have little or no effect on the overall structural integrity of the building because the mass of the plane is very small compared to the mass resistance of the building. In a similar manner, the explosion of a terrorist bomb in the north tower basement during 1993 created a large hole, but did no real damage to the overall structural integrity of the building.

However, the Boeing 767s that hit the towers were much larger than expected, and had much greater fuel capacities. The impact of the fuel explosion and the ensuing fire was not considered in the building design.

Buildings collapsed because of explosions and fire

Video evidence suggests that the initial impact would have caused only local structural damage. The towers would have survived the impacts had it not been for the ensuing explosions and fire. The 250 or so fire fighters and police officers were ordered into the towers in the belief that they would not collapse – sadly none of them survived. This was a tragic error of judgment. An order for immediate evacuation should have been made at the very beginning.

With so much fuel, the temperature inside the buildings would have exceeded 1000°C. It was only a matter of time before the steel columns and the supporting floor trusses softened and lost all strength, precipitating the inevitable collapse of at least one complete storey at the level of impact. Once this happened, the huge mass of all the floors above would have simply crushed the intact floors below, resulting in the collapse of one storey after another like a row of dominoes. The south tower collapsed first because the plane entered the building at the corner, cutting through the exterior structural frame to either side, whereas the plane that hit the north tower entered more favourably near the middle of the building. It was fortunate that both towers collapsed almost vertically, otherwise there would have been much more devastation.

Are tall buildings in Hong Kong safe from terrorist plane crashes?

The attack on the World Trade Centre towers is thought to have been in the planning for some years, and seems to have been the result of perceived American foreign policy bias in the Middle East. There is no reason to suggest that Hong Kong will be targeted in a similar manner. However, we need not be complacent. Tall buildings in Hong Kong or anywhere else in the world would have met the same fate as did the towers in New York. There was nothing structurally wrong with the design of the twin towers. On the contrary, the buildings performed extremely well in the circumstances. Most other buildings hit by a Boeing 767 with a capacity fuel load would have collapsed almost immediately. The high degree of redundancy inherent in the exterior structural frame delayed the collapse of the buildings by about an hour, thus allowing thousands of occupants the precious time to escape.

It would be hard to imagine how any tall building could be designed to withstand attacks of this nature. Such buildings would be massive and the cost prohibitive. Only nuclear power plants are designed to withstand explosions and fire. Even if we can design and construct new buildings to resist such attacks, how do we make safe a multitude of existing buildings all over the world?

The answer may well lie in the design of aircraft. How do we keep planes out of the hands of terrorists? The challenge is to design them in a manner that would prohibit unauthorised entry into the cockpit even if terrorists could get on board. Only in that way could we arrest the tragedy of passenger planes being used as deadly bombs.

AIIB Newsletter, October edition.

Professor S. Kitipornchai is a Chair Professor in the Department of Building and Construction at the City University of Hong Kong

World Trade Center Investigation "Exonerates" Twin Towers' Design


Structural steel of the twin 110-story towers of the World Trade Center was stripped of its fireproofing by debris from the aircraft impact and weakened by the resulting fires, eventually causing the towers to collapse, according to an interim report by the National Institute of Standards & Technology. The report says the region of dislodged fireproofing was determined from the predicted path of the debris.

“Had the fireproofing not been dislodged, the temperature rise of the structural components would likely have been insufficient to cause the global collapse of the towers,” says NIST in the Oct. 19 release of another interim report of its $16-million study of the WTC destruction on Sept. 11, 2001, by terrorists. “Fireproofing dislodged by debris left the components more sensitive to heat than any areas where there was missing or thin fireproofing before the aircraft impacts,” says the report.

Many experts familiar with the twin towers design are not surprised by the findings. But they are worth noting, say sources, because there are others, both structural engineers and fire experts, who have questioned whether the design by Skilling Helle Christiansen Robertson in some way contributed to the collapse.

According to S. Shyam Sunder, NIST’s lead investigator for the study, an ordinary office fire would likely have resulted in burn-out, not collapse.

Sunder says the working hypothesis for a conventional fire, where sprinklers are not working, is that it IS more likely TO have burn-out without collapse. "If the sprinkler system were not operational in a multifloor fire, our current working hypothesis, without having done the calculations," is that the building would not have collapsed, he says. On 9/11, the building collapsed because the fireproofing on the steel was dislodged by direct debris impact. The steel heated up and softened and lost strength.

In addition, NIST has determined that the majority of the steel was stronger than minimum requirements. “The safety of the towers was most likely not affected by the small percentage of steel below the minimum,” says the report. “Building designs routinely allow structures to withstand greater loads than are expected by including significant factors of safety. Moreover, the structural loads on Sept. 11, 2001, were well below this design level. “

In fire tests in August, NIST also determined that the floor systems in the towers met the New York City building code of the time (ENR 9/13 p. 16).

The findings include an explanation for the time delay between the collapses of the two towers. (The south tower, Two WTC, survived for 56 minutes; the north tower, One WTC, for 103 minutes). NIST says the difference was primarily due to five items: the asymmetrical structural damage of the aircraft impact to Two WTC compared to the aircraft damage to One WTC; the time it took for heat to soften, buckle and shorten core columns that had fireproofing dislodged by debris impact; the structure’s ability to redistribute loads as the core columns shortened; the time it took for fires to traverse from their initial location to the face of the towers where perimeter columns were bowing inward (as seen only minutes before the collapse of each tower); and the time it took for heat to soften and buckle those columns.

NIST plans to release its final draft of the twin towers’ report in December or January. A four to six-week public comment period will follow. The final release is expected in May. The draft report on Seven WTC is set to be released in May. The final report is expected out in July.

 
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